## Explanation/Format

This activity simulates part of a debate about the Taiwan Grand Bargain affirmative. The format of the debate is as follows:

1AC = read the 1AC, not timed (no additions/subtractions)

CX of 1AC = 2 minutes

1NC = read the 1NC, not timed (may only add up to 5 analytical arguments on the case, no subtractions)

CX of 1NC = 2 minutes

2AC = 4 minutes

CX of 2AC = 2 minutes

2NC = 8 minutes

CX of 2NC = 2 minutes

1AR = 3 minutes

2NR = 4 minutes

2AR = 4 minutes

Students should make use of the Taiwan Grand Bargain aff and neg files. The BIT aff/neg files might also be useful.

All debaters will prepare each speech and then we will select a student to give the speech. We may hear additional speech(es) along the way for practice.

## 1AC

### 1AC — Plan

#### The United States federal government should negotiate a grand bargain with the People’s Republic of China by offering to end its commitment to defend Taiwan against Chinese aggression in return for China peacefully resolving its maritime and land disputes in the South China and East China Seas and officially accepting the United States’ long-term military security role in East Asia.

### 1AC — Nuclear War Advantage (Shorter)

#### Contention One: Nuclear War

#### First, China is hardening its position on Taiwan. This risks a major crisis.

White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” *The Straits Times*, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)

It is time to start worrying about Taiwan again.

In the past few years, it has slipped quietly into the background as tensions in the East China Sea and South China Sea have posed more urgent threats to regional peace and stability. But now old questions about Taiwan's longer-term future are re-emerging, and so are old fears that differences over Taiwan could rupture United States-China relations and drive Asia into a major crisis.

Taiwan's status has been a highly sensitive issue between Washington and Beijing ever since 1949, when defeated nationalists withdrew to the island as the communists swept to power in the mainland. The differences were papered over only when US-China relations were opened up after 1972. Taiwan was left in an awkward limbo, neither accepting Beijing's rule nor seeking recognition as an independent country.

Beijing has never wavered in its determination to bring Taiwan eventually under its rule, while America's Taiwan Relations Act enshrines its commitment to support Taiwan in resisting pressure from Beijing to reunify.

In the 1990s, after Taiwan became a vigorous democracy, presidents Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian started to push the boundaries of this status quo, seeking a more normal place for Taiwan in the international community. This infuriated Beijing and escalated tensions between China and America.

These tensions eased when, in 2003, then US President George W. Bush made it clear that the US would not support any Taiwanese push to change the status quo.

After President Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, he stepped back from his predecessors' challenge to the status quo, and instead sought to build relations with Beijing, especially by encouraging commercial ties, which have led to the two sides of the Taiwan Strait becoming deeply intertwined economically.

And China was happy to replace sticks with carrots in dealing with Taipei, apparently expecting that economic integration would eventually pave the way to political reunification, perhaps under the "one country, two systems" formula that Beijing applies to Hong Kong.

But that hope received a severe blow just a year ago, when Mr Ma's plans for closer economic links with the mainland sparked massive "Sunflower" demonstrations in Taipei by mainly young people who feared that economic entanglement would lead inexorably to precisely the political reunification that Beijing so clearly wants and expects. Then late last year, Mr Ma's policy of ever-closer economic relations suffered further repudiation by voters in a crucial round of municipal elections.

It is now widely expected that when Mr Ma's term as president ends next year, he will be replaced by a new leader who will be less accommodating to Beijing. While few expect that any future leader from either the Kuomintang or the Democratic Progressive Party will return to policies as provocative to China as those of Mr Lee or Mr Chen, the new leader will almost certainly be more assertive than Mr Ma has been.

That naturally alarms Beijing, and there is a risk that it will respond by taking a tougher line, looking for new ways to pressure Taipei into accepting the mainland's authority.

China's new leadership under President Xi Jinping seems increasingly impatient to resolve what it sees as the last vestige of China's centuries of humiliation and increasingly confident of its growing power to act with impunity. Already there are signs that its stance on Taiwan is hardening.

#### Second, political pressure in China will continue to grow — the CCP will be forced to act aggressively toward Taiwan.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

A common counterpoint to the argument above is that China-Taiwan relations have improved dramatically since 2008, so the probability of war is low.66 This, in turn, means the expected benefits offered by policies that would keep the United States out of a China-Taiwan conflict have decreased. Although this argument has merit, it is hard to be confident that cross-strait relations will remain good. Taiwan might again elect a more pro-independence government, or China might ramp up pressures for unification. Jia Qingguo, a professor at Peking University, recently wrote: “[P]olitical pressures on the Chinese government when it comes to Taiwan are tremendous and growing. In the past, the Chinese people knew that China was weak and could not stop the United States from selling weapons to Taiwan. Now, many believe that China should no longer tolerate such insulting behavior. Confronted with this mounting domestic pressure, the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] is finding it increasingly difficult to justify its weak responses.”67

#### Third, tensions are already rising because Taiwan’s new government refuses to accept the ‘92 consensus.

Reuters 16 — Reuters, 2016 (“China says has stopped communication mechanism with Taiwan,” *Sydney Morning Herald*, June 26th, Available Online at <http://www.smh.com.au/world/china-says-has-stopped-communication-mechanism-with-taiwan-20160626-gps230.html>, Accessed 06-29-2016)

The Chinese government said on Saturday it had stopped a communication mechanism with Taiwan because of the refusal of the self-ruled island's new government to recognise the "one China" principle, in the latest show of tension between the two.

China, which regards Taiwan as wayward province, is deeply suspicious of Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen, who took office last month, as they suspect she will push for formal independence.

Tsai, who heads the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, says she wants to maintain the status quo with China and is committed to ensuring peace.

But China has insisted she recognise something called the "1992 consensus" reached between China's Communists and Taiwan's then-ruling Nationalists, under which both agreed there is only one China, with each having their own interpretation of what that means.

In a brief statement carried by the official Xinhua news agency, China's Taiwan Affairs Office said that since May 20, when Tsai took office, Taiwan has not affirmed this consensus.

"Because the Taiwan side has not acknowledged the 1992 consensus, this joint political basis for showing the one China principle, the cross Taiwan Strait contact and communication mechanism has already stopped," spokesman An Fengshan said.

#### Fourth, any crisis over Taiwan will escalate quickly — nuclear war is likely.

Littlefield and Lowther 15 — Alex Littlefield, Assistant Professor in the Department of International Trade at Feng Chia University (Taiwan), holds a Ph.D. in International Politics from National Chung Hsing University (Taiwan), and Adam Lowther, Research Professor at the Air Force Research Institute at Maxwell Air Force Base, Director of the School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies at the Air Force Global Strike Command, former Assistant Professor of Political Science at Arkansas Tech University and Columbus State University, holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the University of Alabama, 2015 (“Taiwan and the Prospects for War Between China and America,” *The Diplomat*, August 11th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/taiwan-and-the-prospects-for-war-between-china-and-america/>, Accessed 06-25-2016)

Possible Scenario

While there are several scenarios where conflict between the United States and China is possible, some analysts believe that a conflict over Taiwan remains the most likely place where the PRC and the U.S. would come to blows. Beijing is aware that any coercive action on its part to force Taiwan to accept its political domination could incur the wrath of the United States. To prevent the U.S. from intervening in the region, China will certainly turn to its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy, beginning with non-lethal means and non-lethal threats to discourage the American public from supporting the use of force in support of Taiwan.

If thwarted in its initial efforts to stop Chinese aggression against Taiwan, the United States may be tempted to resort to stronger measures and attack mainland China. A kinetic response to a cyber-attack, for example, although an option, would very likely lead to escalation on the part of the Chinese. Given the regime’s relative weakness and the probability that American attacks (cyber and conventional) on China will include strikes against PLA command and control (C2) nodes, which mingle conventional and nuclear C2, the Chinese may escalate to the use of a nuclear weapon (against a U.S. carrier in China’s self-declared waters for example) as a means of forcing de-escalation.

In the view of China, such a strike would not be a violation of its no-first-use policy because the strike would occur in sovereign Chinese waters, thus making the use of nuclear weapons a defensive act. Since Taiwan is a domestic matter, any U.S. intervention would be viewed as an act of aggression. This, in the minds of the Chinese, makes the United States an outside aggressor, not China.

It is also important to remember that nuclear weapons are an asymmetric response to American conventional superiority. Given that China is incapable of executing and sustaining a conventional military campaign against the continental United States, China would clearly have an asymmetry of interest and capability with the United States – far more is at stake for China than it is for the United States.

In essence, the only effective option in retaliation for a successful U.S. conventional campaign on Chinese soil is the nuclear one. Without making too crude a point, the nuclear option provides more bang for the buck, or yuan. Given that mutually assured destruction (MAD) is not part of China’s strategic thinking – in fact it is explicitly rejected – the PRC will see the situation very differently than the United States.

China likely has no desire to become a nuclear peer of the United States. It does not need to be in order to achieve its geopolitical objectives. However, China does have specific goals that are a part of its stated core security interests, including reunification with Taiwan. Reunification is necessary for China to reach its unstated goal of becoming a regional hegemon. As long as Taiwan maintains its de facto independence of China it acts as a literal and symbolic barrier to China’s power projection beyond the East China Sea. Without Taiwan, China cannot gain military hegemony in its own neighborhood.

China’s maritime land reclamation strategy for Southeast Asia pales in scope and significance with the historical and political value of Taiwan. With Taiwan returned to its rightful place, the relevance to China of the U.S. military presence in Japan and South Korea is greatly diminished. China’s relationship with the Philippines, which lies just to the south of Taiwan, would also change dramatically.

Although China criticizes the United States for playing the role of global hegemon, it is actively seeking to supplant the United States in Asia so that it can play a similar role in the region. While Beijing may take a longer view toward geopolitical issues than Washington does, Chinese political leaders must still be responsive to a domestic audience that demands ever higher levels of prosperity.

Central to China’s ability to guarantee that prosperity is the return of Taiwan, and control of the sea lines of commerce and communication upon which it relies. Unfortunately, too many Americans underestimate the importance of these core interests to China and the lengths to which China will ultimately go in order to guarantee them – even the use of nuclear weapons.

Should China succeed it pushing the United States back, the PRC can deal with regional territorial disputes bilaterally and without U.S. involvement. After all, Washington invariably takes the non-Chinese side.

China sees the U.S. as a direct competitor and obstacle to its geopolitical ambitions. As such it is preparing for the next step in a crisis that it will likely instigate, control, and conclude in the Taiwan Straits. China will likely use the election or statement of a pro-independence high-ranking official as the impetus for action. This is the same method it used when it fired missiles in the Straits in response to remarks by then-President Lee Teng-hui, ushering in the 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis. The U.S. brought an end to the mainland’s antics when the U.S.S Nimitz and six additional ships sailed into the Straits.

Despite the pro-China presidency of Ma Ying-jeou, China continues to expand its missile force targeting Taiwan and undertakes annual war games that simulate an attack on Taiwan.

China has not forgotten the humiliation it faced in 1996 and will be certain no U.S. carrier groups have access to the Strait during the next crisis. The Second Artillery Corps’ nuclear capabilities exist to help secure the results China seeks when the U.S. is caught off-guard, overwhelmed, and forced to either escalate a crisis or capitulate.

#### Fifth, any U.S. attempt to protect Taiwan will escalate to full-scale nuclear war.

White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” *The Straits Times*, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)

Even more worryingly, this reality does not yet seem to have sunk in in Washington, where leaders still talk boldly about their willingness to stand by Taiwan without seriously considering what that might mean in practice. Any US effort to support Taiwan militarily against China would be almost certain to escalate into a full-scale US-China war and quite possibly a nuclear exchange. That would be a disaster for everyone, including, of course, the people of Taiwan itself — far worse than reunification, in fact.

#### Sixth, tensions over Taiwan are the root cause of other regional tensions. A grand bargain would eliminate the most likely scenarios for major war.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 2)

Reevaluating The U.S. Commitment To Taiwan

China’s rise poses difficult challenges for the United States. If military competition and political frictions continue to intensify, the United States could find itself engaged in a new cold war. China has long made clear that unification with Taiwan is a paramount political and security goal. The United States is currently committed to defending Taiwan if China launches an unprovoked attack. This commitment is a deep source of Chinese distrust of, and tension with, the United States. Consequently, the United States should consider ending this commitment. Doing so would have both benefits and costs.

Benefits. Eliminating the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would have three main benefits. First, it would reduce the probability of war between the United States and China over Taiwan. China’s improved military capabilities are reducing the United States’ ability to come to Taiwan’s aid in the event of a challenge from Beijing. These capabilities, combined with China’s expectation of growing regional influence, may lead China to decide to seek reunification with Taiwan through military means. Second, U.S. support for Taiwan may be the most important policy-driven source of China’s suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions in East Asia. Consequently, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations. Third, terminating this commitment could also greatly moderate the intensifying military competition between the United States and China. Much of China’s military modernization, including its growing capability to control the sea lines of communication (SLOCs) in the South China and East China Seas, is dedicated to defending Taiwan. The United States has devised a concept, widely known as AirSea Battle, to counter China’s increasing capabilities and maintain dominance of these SLOCs. Ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would eliminate the scenario most likely to draw the United States into a large war with China, thus reducing the importance that China places on controlling these SLOCs and helping to significantly moderate U.S.-China competition.

#### Finally, U.S.-China war immediately kills millions — and the fallout would destroy the planet.

Wittner 11 — Lawrence S. Wittner, Emeritus Professor of History at the State University of New York at Albany, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, 2011 (“Is a Nuclear War with China Possible?,” *Huntington News*, November 28th, Available Online at http://www.huntingtonnews.net/14446, Accessed 02-07-2013)

While nuclear weapons exist, there remains a danger that they will be used. After all, for centuries national conflicts have led to wars, with nations employing their deadliest weapons. The current deterioration of U.S. relations with China might end up providing us with yet another example of this phenomenon.

The gathering tension between the United States and China is clear enough. Disturbed by China’s growing economic and military strength, the U.S. government recently challenged China’s claims in the South China Sea, increased the U.S. military presence in Australia, and deepened U.S. military ties with other nations in the Pacific region. According to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, the United States was “asserting our own position as a Pacific power.”

But need this lead to nuclear war?

Not necessarily. And yet, there are signs that it could. After all, both the United States and China possess large numbers of nuclear weapons. The U.S. government threatened to attack China with nuclear weapons during the Korean War and, later, during the conflict over the future of China’s offshore islands, Quemoy and Matsu. In the midst of the latter confrontation, President Dwight Eisenhower declared publicly, and chillingly, that U.S. nuclear weapons would “be used just exactly as you would use a bullet or anything else.”

Of course, China didn’t have nuclear weapons then. Now that it does, perhaps the behavior of national leaders will be more temperate. But the loose nuclear threats of U.S. and Soviet government officials during the Cold War, when both nations had vast nuclear arsenals, should convince us that, even as the military ante is raised, nuclear saber-rattling persists.

Some pundits argue that nuclear weapons prevent wars between nuclear-armed nations; and, admittedly, there haven’t been very many—at least not yet. But the Kargil War of 1999, between nuclear-armed India and nuclear-armed Pakistan, should convince us that such wars can occur. Indeed, in that case, the conflict almost slipped into a nuclear war. Pakistan’s foreign secretary threatened that, if the war escalated, his country felt free to use “any weapon” in its arsenal. During the conflict, Pakistan did move nuclear weapons toward its border, while India, it is claimed, readied its own nuclear missiles for an attack on Pakistan.

At the least, though, don’t nuclear weapons deter a nuclear attack? Do they? Obviously, NATO leaders didn’t feel deterred, for, throughout the Cold War, NATO’s strategy was to respond to a Soviet conventional military attack on Western Europe by launching a Western nuclear attack on the nuclear-armed Soviet Union. Furthermore, if U.S. government officials really believed that nuclear deterrence worked, they would not have resorted to championing “Star Wars” and its modern variant, national missile defense. Why are these vastly expensive—and probably unworkable—military defense systems needed if other nuclear powers are deterred from attacking by U.S. nuclear might?

Of course, the bottom line for those Americans convinced that nuclear weapons safeguard them from a Chinese nuclear attack might be that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is far greater than its Chinese counterpart. Today, it is estimated that the U.S. government possesses over five thousand nuclear warheads, while the Chinese government has a total inventory of roughly three hundred. Moreover, only about forty of these Chinese nuclear weapons can reach the United States. Surely the United States would “win” any nuclear war with China.

But what would that “victory” entail? A nuclear attack by China would immediately slaughter at least 10 million Americans in a great storm of blast and fire, while leaving many more dying horribly of sickness and radiation poisoning. The Chinese death toll in a nuclear war would be far higher. Both nations would be reduced to smoldering, radioactive wastelands. Also, radioactive debris sent aloft by the nuclear explosions would blot out the sun and bring on a “nuclear winter” around the globe—destroying agriculture, creating worldwide famine, and generating chaos and destruction.

Moreover, in another decade the extent of this catastrophe would be far worse. The Chinese government is currently expanding its nuclear arsenal, and by the year 2020 it is expected to more than double its number of nuclear weapons that can hit the United States. The U.S. government, in turn, has plans to spend hundreds of billions of dollars “modernizing” its nuclear weapons and nuclear production facilities over the next decade.

To avert the enormous disaster of a U.S.-China nuclear war, there are two obvious actions that can be taken. The first is to get rid of nuclear weapons, as the nuclear powers have agreed to do but thus far have resisted doing. The second, conducted while the nuclear disarmament process is occurring, is to improve U.S.-China relations. If the American and Chinese people are interested in ensuring their survival and that of the world, they should be working to encourage these policies.

### 1AC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage

#### Contention Two: U.S.-China Relations

#### First, U.S.-China relations have reached a dangerous tipping point — overcoming mutual hostility is vital.

Lampton 15 — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“China and the United States: A Conversation with David M. Lampton,” The Asia Foundation, July 29th, Available Online at <http://asiafoundation.org/2015/07/29/china-and-the-united-states-a-conversation-with-david-m-lampton/>, Accessed 06-29-2016)

*You have publicly warned that the U.S.-China relationship is at a critical “tipping point.” From your perspective as a longtime China watcher, what do you think about the future trajectory of bilateral relations?*

I said we were approaching a tipping point. I didn’t say we had gone off the cliff. I don’t know if we’re five feet, five yards, or five miles from that point, but we’re a lot closer to it than I’d like to be.

For the 40-plus years since Nixon went to China, and certainly since Deng Xiaoping came back to power in 1977, most Americans have seen China as going in the “right direction” in terms of foreign and domestic policy – with ups and downs, to be sure. 1989 raised questions. But Deng Xiaoping and George H. W. Bush got ties modestly back on track. China was opening up, investing in the world. Most Americans saw China as moving in the right direction. Conversely, most Chinese saw the U.S. as basically moving in the right direction in terms of policy towards China.

Somewhere around 2008 to 2010, each side began to wonder about the direction of the other. With the rise of South China Sea problems, Diaoyu, and anti-Japanese demonstrations, many Americans weren’t so sure China was going in the right direction, particularly during the global financial crisis. Americans were worried about their economic future. China had a very big trade surplus. It seemed that China was successful but at the same time was going the wrong way in terms of foreign and domestic policy. I think most Americans are approaching the point where they believe it’s going the wrong way for us. The election coming up is going to give voice to that.

In China, one of the first questions they ask is, “Why is the U.S. trying to keep China down or contain China?” One of the major things pushing this is: when you have positive expectations for the future, you then have positive policies and you subordinate frictions, because the long term is going to be better. But if you think the future is going to be worse, you fall into a threatening posture; you’re not willing to overlook current frictions. Mentally, where the two peoples currently are is not a healthy place.

We’re moving from a relationship that was trying to find partnership to one now of deterrence. And threats are a key part of that. China has one aircraft carrier, is building another one for sure, and maybe a third one. China is putting military capability on some of these island reclamation projects in the South China Sea. China’s recent military White Paper said the PRC was going to build a more seaworthy, power-projection navy. And the U.S., with the Pivot announcement in 2011, rotating troops – small forces – through Australia, and tightening up our alliance structure with Japan, all that creates anxiety in Beijing. Now we’ve got joint exercises with Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. These are worrisome developments for China. So what you see is that we’re each reacting to the other. The relationship is becoming fundamentally more competitive. My feeling about this tipping point is that psychologically, both our people are going in the wrong direction. And the underlying security relationship is deteriorating. My remarks on the tipping point weren’t so much to criticize one party or the other, but were more of a call to say, “Let’s address the real problem.”

#### Second, the plan is *the only way* to reverse this trend — resolving Taiwan overcomes every other impediment to strong relations.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

More important, however, is that focusing on the quality of current cross-strait relations overlooks two other less direct, but potentially more significant, benefits of U.S. accommodation on Taiwan. First, U.S. support for Taiwan is one of the most important, possibly the most important, policy-driven sources of China's suspicions about U.S. motives and intentions. Although the United States does not take a position on what the final outcome of the Taiwan issue should be, China considers U.S. support of Taiwan a key source of “strategic distrust.” A recent study by two leading authorities on U.S.-China relations concludes that Beijing views U.S. arms sales to Taiwan “as confirming American arrogance and determination to interfere in China's domestic affairs and to prevent peaceful unification from occurring, thereby harming a clearly-articulated Chinese core interest.” In a similar vein, their report argues that “continuing to provide Taiwan with advanced weapons … is viewed as pernicious in Chinese eyes and has added to suspicion that Washington will disregard Chinese interests and sentiments as long as China's power position is secondary to America's.”68 Nathan and Scobell conclude that “most Chinese see strategic motives at the root of American behavior. They believe that keeping the Taiwan problem going helps the U.S. tie China down.”69 Similarly, a prominent Chinese analyst argues: “The position the U.S. takes on the Taiwan issue determines the essence of American strategy toward China, and thus determines the quality and status of U.S.-China relations.”70 Xu Hui, a professor at China's National Defense University, holds that “U.S. policies toward Taiwan have been and are the fundamental cause of some anti-American sentiment among the Chinese public. … I assure you that a posture change of the U.S. policy on Taiwan will remove the major obstacle for our military-to-military relations and also strengthen Sino-American cooperation by winning the hearts and minds of 1.3 billion Chinese people.”71 In short, ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan has the potential to dramatically improve U.S.-China relations, which in turn could increase the possibility of cooperation on other issues and reduce the probability of competition and conflict.

#### Third, crossing the tipping point increases the risk of war and undermines cooperation. Relations *aren’t* resilient without the plan.

Lampton 15 — David M. Lampton, Chairman of the Board of The Asia Foundation, Hyman Professor and Director of SAIS-China and China Studies at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, Member and former President of the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations Executive Committee, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations, was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing in 2015, holds a Ph.D. from Stanford University, 2015 (“A Tipping Point in U.S.-China Relations is Upon Us,” *U.S.-China Perception Monitor*, May 11th, Available Online at  [http://www.uscnpm.org/blog/2015/05/11/a-tipping-point-in-u-s-china-relations-is-upon-us-part-i/](http://asiafoundation.org/2015/07/29/china-and-the-united-states-a-conversation-with-david-m-lampton/), Accessed 06-29-2016)

For eight U.S. and five Chinese administrations, Washington and Beijing maintained remarkable policy continuity—broadly speaking, constructive engagement. This continuity has persisted despite periodic instabilities, problems, and crises. Some of these developments required time, flexibility, and wisdom to heal. They sometimes left scar tissue. But, none of these challenges ever destroyed overall assessments in both our nations that we each had fundamental, shared interests requiring cooperation and that the costs of conflict outweighed possible gains.

Assessments of relative power in both countries for much of the last four decades created few incentives in either society to rethink fundamental policy. Chinese seemingly were resigned to “live with the hegemon,” as one respected Chinese professor put it, and Americans were secure in their dominance and preoccupied with conflicts elsewhere. After the 9/11 attacks on America, China was seen as non-threatening, indeed willing to use some of its resources in the “War on Terror.” In a reflective moment after the 9/11 attacks, then Ambassador to China Sandy Randt delivered a speech to Johns Hopkins–SAIS in which he said, “We have seen the enemy, and it is not China.”

In the economic realm, expectations for growth in each society created common interests that subordinated many underlying frictions, whether economic or human rights. The positive balance between hope and fear tipped behavior toward restraint and patience. Things unfortunately have changed dramatically since about 2010. The tipping point is near. Our respective fears are nearer to outweighing our hopes than at any time since normalization.

We are witnessing the erosion of some critical underlying supports for predominantly positive U.S.-China ties. Though the foundation has not crumbled, today important components of the American policy elite increasingly are coming to see China as a threat to American “primacy.” In China, increasing fractions of the elite and public see America as an impediment to China’s achieving its rightful international role and not helpful to maintaining domestic stability.

Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd put it well, characterizing the narrative of an unidentified Chinese Communist Party document [perhaps the new National Security Blue Book], and analogous American thinking, in the following terms: “In Beijing’s eyes the U.S. is deeply opposed to China’s rise … American strategy toward China, it said, had five objectives: to isolate the country, contain it, diminish it, divide it, and sabotage its political leadership.” The American narrative, as Rudd described it, is hardly more positive about Beijing: “Beijing’s long-term policy is aimed at pushing the U.S. out of Asia altogether and establishing a Chinese sphere of influence spanning the region.”[1]

Since about 2008, there has been a sequence of regional and global developments and incidents that have provided fertile soil in which these negative narratives have grown in each of our societies. Among them are: the 2008 financial crisis, incidents in Hong Kong, developments in the south and east China seas, U.S. inability to quickly exit Middle Eastern and Central Asian quagmires, and the confusion in America and elsewhere about where China is headed internally and in terms of its foreign policy. Current Chinese debate over western (universal) values, subversion, and “black hands” unsettles most outside observers, not least Americans.

What is happening? If developments continue along the current trajectory, both countries will have progressively less security, at higher cost; the probabilities of intentional, accidental, or catalytic violent confrontations will increase; the world will enjoy less cooperation on transnational issues requiring joint Sino-American efforts; and, economic welfare in both societies will be diminished. What can be done?

Fundamentally, America has to rethink its objective of primacy and China must recalibrate its own sense of strength and what that entitles it to. Americans must find ways to accommodate China’s rightful desire for greater voice in international affairs and institutions such as the IMF, and China should improve relations with its neighbors—reassure them. The words “accommodation” or “compromise” in either China or the United States should not be dirty words. Both nations must be more realistic about their own power, what constitutes power, and how it can be exercised in a world in which a central reality is interdependence. Sino-American interdependence needs to be systematically reinforced, and joint security and economic institutions must be created. Balance and stability in Asia should be our objective, not the primacy of either side.

#### Finally, U.S.-China cooperation is crucial to address all global challenges.

Cohen et al. 9 — William S. Cohen, Chairman and CEO of The Cohen Group—a strategic business consulting firm, served as Secretary of Defense from 1997 until 2001, served in the U.S. Senate from 1979 to 1997 and in the U.S. House of Representatives from 1975 to 1979, et al., 2009 (“Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations,” *Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations: A Report of the CSIS Commission on China*, March, Available Online at http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090304\_mcgiffert\_uschinasmartpower\_web.pdf, Accessed 08-13-2012, p. 1)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the U.S.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation.

### 1AC — Solvency

#### Contention ( ): Solvency

#### First, the plan removes the biggest potential flashpoint for U.S.-Sino nuclear conflict. This creates sustainable peace and strong U.S.-Sino relations — containment strategies are counterproductive.

Glaser 11 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2011 (“Will China's Rise Lead to War? Why Realism Does Not Mean Pessimism,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 90, Number 2, March/April, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Lexis-Nexis)

Accommodation On Taiwan?

The prospects for avoiding intense military competition and war may be good, but growth in China's power may nevertheless require some changes in U.S. foreign policy that Washington will find disagreeable -- particularly regarding Taiwan. Although it lost control of Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War more than six decades ago, China still considers Taiwan to be part of its homeland, and unification remains a key political goal for Beijing. China has made clear that it will use force if Taiwan declares independence, and much of China's conventional military buildup has been dedicated to increasing its ability to coerce Taiwan and reducing the United States' ability to intervene. Because China places such high value on Taiwan and because the United States and China — whatever they might formally agree to — have such different attitudes regarding the legitimacy of the status quo, the issue poses special dangers and challenges for the U.S.-Chinese relationship, placing it in a different category than Japan or South Korea.

A crisis over Taiwan could fairly easily escalate to nuclear war, because each step along the way might well seem rational to the actors involved. Current U.S. policy is designed to reduce the probability that Taiwan will declare independence and to make clear that the United States will not come to Taiwan's aid if it does. Nevertheless, the United States would find itself under pressure to protect Taiwan against any sort of attack, no matter how it originated. Given the different interests and perceptions of the various parties and the limited control Washington has over Taipei's behavior, a crisis could unfold in which the United States found itself following events rather than leading them.

Such dangers have been around for decades, but ongoing improvements in China's military capabilities may make Beijing more willing to escalate a Taiwan crisis. In addition to its improved conventional capabilities, China is modernizing its nuclear forces to increase their ability to survive and retaliate following a large-scale U.S. attack. Standard deterrence theory holds that Washington's current ability to destroy most or all of China's nuclear force enhances its bargaining position. China's nuclear modernization might remove that check on Chinese action, leading Beijing to behave more boldly in future crises than it has in past ones. A U.S. attempt to preserve its ability to defend Taiwan, meanwhile, could fuel a conventional and nuclear arms race. Enhancements to U.S. offensive targeting capabilities and strategic ballistic missile defenses might be interpreted by China as a signal of malign U.S. motives, leading to further Chinese military efforts and a general poisoning of U.S.-Chinese relations.

Given such risks, the United States should consider backing away from its commitment to Taiwan. This would remove the most obvious and contentious flash point between the United States and China and smooth the way for better relations between them in the decades to come. Critics of such a move argue that it would result in not only direct costs for the United States and Taiwan but indirect costs as well: Beijing would not be satisfied by such appeasement; instead, it would find its appetite whetted and make even greater demands afterward — spurred by Washington's lost credibility as a defender of its allies. The critics are wrong, however, because territorial concessions are not always bound to fail. Not all adversaries are Hitler, and when they are not, accommodation can be an effective policy tool. When an adversary has limited territorial goals, granting them can lead not to further demands but rather to satisfaction with the new status quo and a reduction of tension.

#### Second, a *quid-pro-quo* grand bargain is key — it maintains U.S. resolve.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

Insisting on Chinese concessions would also demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect American interests. By making its willingness to end its commitment to Taiwan contingent on Chinese concessions, the United States would make clear that it is willing to run the risk of protecting Taiwan and its allies' interests in the South China and East China Seas, if China were uncompromising. Once again, the key issue from the U.S. perspective comes back to information—if China is more likely to have unlimited aims, then the risks of U.S. accommodation are larger and the United States should therefore be less willing to adopt this strategy. As argued above, China's refusal to accept a grand bargain, especially one that is so clearly weighted toward its interests (unless China is determined to push the United States out of Northeast Asia), would indicate more ambitious Chinese aims. Thus, compared to unilateral concessions, insisting on a package deal that included Chinese concessions would demonstrate a higher level of U.S. resolve. In addition, resolution of the maritime disputes would directly increase U.S. security by eliminating disputes that, via alliance commitments, could draw the United States into dangerous crises with China.

## 1NC

### 1NC — Deterrence DA

#### First/next off is the Deterrence DA.

#### First, the U.S. will maintain its hegemony in the Asia-Pacific *unless* it abandons Taiwan.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Many observers see America in permanent decline and China as the anointed regional hegemon, but both of these outcomes are highly uncertain. Although now in the trough of an unemployment and fiscal crisis, the United States will probably recover. Conversely, China faces serious limits to its bid for regional leadership. These include internal vulnerabilities such as an aging population, the potential for large-scale political turmoil caused by groups angry at the Chinese government, and the necessity of making huge and painful adjustments to the Chinese economy.

Externally, few states in Asia prefer Chinese to U.S. leadership. Unless China becomes overwhelmingly strong and American capabilities greatly diminish, security cooperation among the Asia-Pacific countries in defense of widely-accepted norms of international behavior will be sufficient to check those Chinese aspirations that are illegitimate in that they forcibly intrude on other people’s vital interests.

One of these illegitimate aspirations is the notion that China cannot be a prosperous, secure great power without politically absorbing Taiwan, the last big piece of unfinished business from China’s “century of humiliation.” Abandoning Taiwan would, tragically, acquiesce to this notion. The threat of Taiwan independence is an unfortunate invention of the Chinese Communist Party. It is a fake threat. An autonomous Taiwan is not preventing massive increases in China’s prosperity and security. On the other hand, Beijing’s threat to militarily destroy the political system and political identity chosen by Taiwan’s people is real.

Abandoning Taiwan is completely at odds with the broad U.S. agenda for international affairs as well as with the specific policy of “re-balancing” toward Asia. Washington should consider cutting off its support to Taiwan only if the United States has decided to abdicate its leadership role in the Asia-Pacific region and pull its influence back to the Western Hemisphere.

#### Second, the plan increases the risk of nuclear war — it emboldens China, destroys the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and crushes U.S. hegemony in Asia.

Lee 11 — Shyu-Tu Lee, President of the North America Taiwanese Professors' Association, 2011 (“Disengaging From Taiwan,” *Foreign Affairs*, Volume 90, Issue 4, July/August, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Academic Search Elite)

According to Charles Glaser, the prospects for avoiding war between the United States and China are good ("Will China's Rise Lead to War?" March/April 2011). But by ignoring China's history and economic policy and other relevant factors, Glaser arrives at policy prescriptions that would increase the chance of a Chinese nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland.

Glaser misjudges Chinese motives. China's military modernization is not primarily motivated by insecurity, as he asserts. China is not threatened by the United States or any of its neighbors. It is advocating its model of governance—managed capitalism combined with one-party authoritarianism—as a more efficient alternative to a free-market economy and democracy. China's mission is to regain its place as the dominant superpower so that the country can cleanse itself of the humiliation it has experienced at the hands of the West.

The rise of China poses grave challenges to U.S. security. Beijing implements a mercantilist trade policy and artificially sets a low value on its currency to promote exports, thus creating a large U.S. trade deficit with China year after year. Its army has been modernizing at a rapid pace, developing anti-access, area-denial weapons and cyber- and space-warfare capabilities. Meanwhile, China wants to integrate Taiwan because its democracy threatens Beijing's autocratic and repressive rule. In addition, Beijing needs Taiwan as a military base from which to project power into the Indian and Pacific oceans.

To keep the peace, the United States must discard the culture of excessive deference to Beijing and implement policies to maintain U.S. military superiority, stanch the flow of U.S. wealth to China, steer China toward democratization, strengthen its alliances with Japan and South Korea, and engage China in an economic and strategic dialogue to promote fair trade and avoid misunderstandings.

To prevent a crisis from escalating to nuclear war, Glaser says that the United States should back away from its commitment to Taiwan. Such accommodation, he argues, would smooth the way for better relations with China in the decades to come. Yet if Taiwan were to fall, the United States would suffer a geostrategic disaster. The sea-lanes and airspace around Taiwan are critical to the survival of Japan and South Korea. Once in control of Taiwan, China could turn Japan and South Korea into vassal states. With the demise of the U.S.-Japanese military alliance, the United States would be forced to retreat to Hawaii.

#### Third, this sparks global arms races and nuclear proliferation.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

White’s realism isn’t a solution; it’s a recipe for chaos. By accumulating enough comprehensive national power, and by crossing the nuclear threshold, states would have free rein to make irredentist or expansionist territorial claims on weaker states, a return to the scorpions-filled bottle pre–World War I, only this time the critters are bristling with nuclear weapons. Not only would this invite aggression by powerful states, it would create incentives for acquiring nuclear weapons and thereby bury existing nonproliferation regimes, not to mention spark arms races all over the planet. If force is the only determinant of international politics, this is the only foreseeable outcome. Moreover, how much comprehensive power would a state assume is necessary in order to get away with aggression? How many nuclear warheads? Rather than bring stability, White’s world would encourage miscalculation.

#### Finally, proliferation causes nuclear war — turns the case.

Utgoff 2 — Victor A. Utgoff, Deputy Director of the Strategy, Forces, and Resources Division of the Institute for Defense Analyses and senior member of the National Security Council Staff, 2002 (“Proliferation, Missile Defence And American Ambitions,” *Survival*, Volume 44, Number 2, June, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via EBSCOhost Electronic Journals Service, p. 87-90)

In sum, widespread proliferation is likely to lead to an occasional shoot-out with nuclear weapons, and that such shoot-outs will have a substantial probability of escalating to the maximum destruction possible with the weapons at hand. Unless nuclear proliferation is stopped, we are headed toward a world that will mirror the American Wild West of the late 1800s. With most, if not all, nations wearing nuclear 'six-shooters' on their hips, the world may even be a more polite place than it is today, but every once in a while we will all gather on a hill to bury the bodies of dead cities or even whole nations.

### 1NC — Nuclear War Advantage

#### 1. No War — China won’t sacrifice its economy to annex Taiwan.

Cole 15 — J. Michael Cole, Associate Researcher at the French Centre for Research on Contemporary China, Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of Nottingham, China Correspondent for *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Senior Member and Editor in Chief at the Thinking Taiwan Foundation—a Taiwanese English-language publication founded by current Taiwanese President Dr. Tsai Ing-wen that provides nonpartisan analysis and commentary, former Deputy News Chief and Reporter for the *Taipei Times*, former Analyst with the Canadian Security Intelligence Service, holds a Master’s in War Studies from the Royal Military College of Canada, 2015 (“If the Unthinkable Occurred: America Should Stand Up to China over Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, May 7th, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/feature/if-the-unthinkable-occured-america-should-stand-china-over-12825?page=show, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Ironically, White seems almost convinced that China would be willing to engage in nuclear war over Taiwan, an assumption that is both untested and portrays the leadership in Beijing as a bunch of deranged nihilists. For all its faults, and despite the official rhetoric depicting Taiwan as a “core issue,” it is in my view unlikely that the Chinese Communist Party would unleash its nuclear arsenal over the matter of Taiwan; in fact, I would advance that it is probably unwilling to gamble China’s economy over Taiwan by launching major military operations—all the more so if there is a promise that such a course of action would result in a concerted response on the part of the international community. The logic of deterrence is that it diminishes the likelihood that the international community would be faced with the maximalist options given us by White. (The bluster only works if we believe it—and Beijing wants us to believe it just like the good professor seems to do—as winning without a fight is a foundational element of Chinese military strategy.)

#### 2. Turn — the plan causes China-Taiwan war. Taiwan won’t go down without a fight.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Advocates of abandoning Taiwan may erroneously believe that halting U.S. military and diplomatic support for Taipei would reduce tensions in East Asia. This is certainly what Beijing would have us believe. According to Chinese officials and commentators, U.S. assistance to Taipei is all that stands in the way of peaceful unification, and without it the people of Taiwan would stop resisting and accept Beijing’s terms for unification. This premise, however, ignores an important reality: the main obstacle to unification is not U.S. arms sales, but rather Taiwanese nationalism and the wish of nearly all Taiwan’s people not to be ruled by the Chinese Communist Party. Thus, withdrawal of U.S. support would not necessarily lead to a peaceful resolution of the cross-Strait imbroglio. The opposite outcome is at least as likely. Deterrence against an attack by the People’s Liberation Army would be weakened, while Taiwan’s people may well choose to fight rather than capitulate.

#### 3. No Solvency — concessions won’t change China’s long-term behavior.

Jackson 15 — Van Jackson, Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security, International Affairs Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, Visiting Scholar and Adjunct Assistant Professor with the Asian Studies Program in the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, former Strategist and Policy Adviser focused on the Asia-Pacific at the Office of the Secretary of Defense, holds a Ph.D. in World Politics from The Catholic University of America, 2015 (“The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain,” *The Diplomat*, August 6th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

But grand bargains rarely work. There’s a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes. And policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises.

#### 4. Status Quo Solves — economic cooperation is resolving tensions.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

No Panacea

The concept of a U.S.-China grand bargain offers a creative attempt at a strategy to resolve some of the most intractable issues hindering improved cooperation between the two countries. Even if implemented, this proposed strategy would not serve as a panacea to all the issues facing the United States and China. Any bargain would face serious pitfalls that would cast doubt over the longevity of its provisions. In light of the contentious land disputes in the South China Sea and continuing tension over the unresolved question of Taiwan, an idealistic resolution might seem a productive step forward.

The Taiwan problem is deeply entrenched within China and Taiwan’s political culture and it cannot be solved in one fell swoop. A grand bargain is an encouraging, yet illusive notion. The framework of a grand bargain might serve as a useful blueprint for future cooperation, but the current status quo already acts as a positive foundation for future China-Taiwan relations and should remain in place.

As Taiwan’s March 2016 presidential election rapidly approaches, the concept of a grand bargain appears particularly ill-conceived. In all likelihood, neither party’s candidate will risk alienating public support by pushing a radical plan for unification or separation. Increased economic cooperation will continue to maintain the equilibrium between the two nations and could even mitigate the most contentious issues that bedevil U.S.-China and China-Taiwan relations. While it is possible that these issues may pose a future threat, the current Taiwan problem is not broken, and there is no need to fix it.

### 1NC — U.S.-China Relations Advantage

#### 1. Taiwan Not Key — U.S. support *doesn’t* undermine U.S.-China relations.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Myth #1: Taiwan Is an Obstacle to Better U.S.-China Relations

Glaser and others who espouse the benefits of a U.S.-China grand bargain allege that the unresolved question of Taiwanese independence has impeded healthy U.S.-China relations. To test this assertion, it is important to consider the reality of recent China-Taiwan interactions.

The issues of Taiwan’s disputed status and U.S. arms sales to Taiwan remain perhaps the most outstanding problems between the United States and China. Still, even these issues no longer impede U.S.-China relations. The question of Taiwanese independence emerged in the 1990s with the nation’s transition to democracy. As the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) gained control over Taiwan in subsequent elections, then-President Chen Shui-bian amplified Taiwan’s calls for independence. The 2005 passage of the Anti-Secession Law\* in China served as a sharp response to Taiwan’s ambitions for independence. Meanwhile, former President George W. Bush clarified the U.S. position of “strategic ambiguity” over the Taiwan issue with a powerful proclamation: The United States would not want to see Taiwan provoke China, but the United States would help defend Taiwan if China were to lose its patience with Taiwan and use force to achieve unification with the island. This statement made it clear that the United States did not support either formal Taiwanese independence or forceful unification. This policy position effectively stabilized the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Since then, no further attempts have been made to upend the balance between China and Taiwan.

Nor should U.S. arms sales to Taiwan be regarded as a serious barrier to U.S.-China relations. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 stipulates that the United States will provide Taiwan with arms of a defense nature. Although China often uses the United States’ periodic decision to sell arms to Taiwan as a political ploy to suspend the Chinese military’s contact with the United States and stir up nationalistic sentiments, the issue needs to be put into perspective. While all arms are technically offensive in nature, the quantity and quality of the weapons Taiwan receives from the United States do little Taiwan’s offensive capabilities. For example, Taiwan purchases short-range fighter jets, air defense systems, and older-generation weapons.

In addition, U.S. authorization to sell arms to Taiwan differs from the actual delivery of weapon systems. The United States has declined to provide the quality of weapons that Taiwan has requested from time to time. Moreover, Taiwan’s legislature has often failed to appropriate the funds necessary to purchase the quantity of weapons requested.

Finally, China’s periodic suspensions of its military contacts with the United States have failed to inflict significant damage on U.S.-China relations and relations are regularly quietly restored once the political storm subsides. Beijing understands that Taiwan’s weaponry does not pose a serious threat to mainland China’s military. Bearing this in mind, it seems evident that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan act as mere political pretense for China’s antagonistic behavior and are not serious obstacles.

In fact, the past several decades have produced a relatively stable economic and political equilibrium between China and Taiwan. Most recently, the 2008 election of President Ma Ying-jeou has ushered in an era of unprecedented China-Taiwan cooperation. Economic integration, highlighted by a 2010 bilateral trade agreement, has inextricably linked Beijing and Taipei. In fact, the health of Taiwan’s economy relies on revenue from Chinese trade. According to 2014 Chinese statistics, trade volume between the two nations totaled more than 200 billion dollars. Taiwan also exports most of its goods to China and enjoys a huge trade surplus. Yearly trends indicate that the economic bonds between the two nations are getting even stronger: From 2014 to 2015, trade between the two nations increased 16.7 per cent.

#### 2. No Solvency — a grand bargain *won’t* restore strong relations.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

Another dubious assumption is that removing the Taiwan issue from U.S.-China relations would clear the way for a vastly improved bilateral relationship. It is true that Taiwan is the greatest single irritant in U.S.-China relations, that U.S. support for Taiwan reinforces Chinese suspicions of an American “containment” strategy, and that the cross-Strait war scenario is a major rationale for China’s military modernization and buildup. But neither U.S.-China relations nor Chinese regional behavior would improve much, if at all, as a result of a U.S. sellout of Taiwan. The Chinese would still have many other reasons to believe the United States is trying to keep China from rising, such as the U.S. alliances, increased American security cooperation with other governments in the region, and the alleged American “meddling” in the South China Sea dispute.

#### 3. No Spillover To Other Issues — China will pocket the concession without supporting the U.S.’s agenda.

Roy 12 — Denny Roy, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of the POSCO Fellowship Program at the East-West Center—a U.S.-based institution for public diplomacy in the Asia Pacific region, former Professor at the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, former Faculty Member in the National Security Affairs Department at the Naval Postgraduate School, former Research Fellow with the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre at the Australian National University in Canberra, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Chicago, 2012 (“Why the U.S. shouldn't abandon Taiwan,” *Time*, December 6th, Available Online at http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2012/12/06/why-the-u-s-shouldnt-abandon-taiwan/, Accessed 06-28-2016)

There is no reason to expect that China would do more to further the American agenda on issues such as the North Korean and Iran nuclear weapons crises, since Chinese policy follows Chinese self-interests. Most importantly, Taiwan is not the source of China-U.S. friction. The two main Asia-Pacific powers are engaged in a rivalry for regional leadership and, even more fundamentally, in a struggle between two competing models for conducting international relations: one based on modern international laws and norms, and the other based on a return to the Sinocentric sphere of influence that prevailed for much of history. Rather than satisfying and pacifying Beijing, a U.S. concession regarding Taiwan might embolden Chinese demands for more concessions aimed at further weakening America’s strategic position in the Asia-Pacific region.

### 1NC — Solvency

#### China Says *No* to the grand bargain:

#### 1. Bad Offer — China thinks they *already own* Taiwan.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Myth #2: Taiwan Can Serve as a Bargaining Chip

The effectiveness of a bargaining chip is predicated on whether or not the other party fears losing control of that bargaining chip. From China’s point of view, its claim over Taiwan is indisputable. So why would China make concessions over a bargaining chip it believes it already owns? China already has a powerful economic hold over Taiwan. In addition to economic interdependence, the past several years have also witnessed an increase in direct flights and sea transportation between the two nations. Businesspeople commonly make one-day trips across the Taiwan Strait. An effective unification is already well underway in the economic realm.

In addition, the Taiwanese prefer the status quo of de facto, but not de jure independence. Repeated opinion polls indicate that while more Taiwanese favor independence over unification, a majority of Taiwan’s people prefer to maintain the status quo.

Meanwhile, the threat of Chinese military force acts to dissuade Taiwan from attempting to break away from the mainland. As the Taiwanese gaze across the strait, they are greeted by a massive arsenal of 1,600 ground-to-ground missiles. Chinese anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities act as a potential deterrent to U.S. involvement in the event of an armed conflict between China and Taiwan. This military mismatch between the two sides serves as a potent deterrence to Taiwan attempting a hasty move for independence or even using the threat as a bargaining chip with the Chinese. China is also an increasing presence in Taiwan’s political system by mobilizing support for China-friendly politicians and making extensive donations to pro-China political actors. All in all, the notion of Taiwan as a “bargaining chip” fails to take into account China’s existing influence over Taiwan and complicates the possibility of a grand bargain.

#### 2. Bad Deal — China won’t agree to the “*accept U.S. presence*” condition.

Lingwall 15 — Noah Lingwall, Student at the Schreyer Honors College and Paterno Fellow majoring in History and Global & International Studies at the Pennsylvania State University, Intern at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2015 (“The Taiwan Problem: If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It,” *The Diplomat*, August 8th, Available Online at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-taiwan-problem-if-it-aint-broke-dont-fix-it/>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Myth #3: A “Grand Bargain” Equals “Grand Concessions”

While a U.S.-China grand bargain is heralded as an ideal tactic to secure crucial U.S. interests, one must evaluate the feasibility of the United States’ demands. First, a grand bargain requires China to accept U.S. military bases and alliances in the Asia-Pacific. China’s recent move toward a more “assertive diplomacy” contrasts sharply with the United States’ ambitions to retain its regional power. Chinese President Xi Jinping’s call for a “new type of great power relations” presaged China’s turn toward greater assertiveness on the world stage. The proposal, presented to U.S. President Barack Obama in June 2013, represents China’s first major attempt to set the agenda in U.S.-China relations, reversing China’s historical trend of bowing to U.S. interests and marking a key shift in U.S.-China relations.

Tensions between the United States and China over China’s artificial island construction in the South China Sea indicate that China is loath to accept U.S. interference in the region. Throughout the past several months, U.S. surveillance planes and warships have patrolled the hotly contested South China Sea in an effort to protect freedom of navigation. Verbal exchanges between the two nations have stoked the conflict’s flames. U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter responded to China’s territorial claims by calling for an “immediate and lasting halt to land reclamation by any claimant.” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying responded by reasserting her nation’s rightful claim to disputed territories and condemning U.S. actions as “provocations and instigations.” Hua’s sharp rebuke of U.S. interference in the Asia-Pacific supports China’s commitment to more aggressive diplomacy. These types of interactions suggest that a U.S.-China “grand bargain” could falter on the basis of China’s distaste for U.S. hegemony.

#### 3. Impossible Condition — China *and other claimants* won’t agree on territorial dispute resolution.

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The second condition of a U.S.-China “grand bargain” appears equally insurmountable. Charles Glaser asserts that China would promise to resolve regional land disputes through more peaceful means if the United States were to cede control of Taiwan. As is the case with acceptance of U.S. regional hegemony, this provision of the grand bargain would be difficult to enforce. China currently finds itself besieged by a litany of competing land claims from Japan, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other Asian nations. Based on China’s recent aggressive behavior in the South China Sea and President Xi Jinping’s “assertive diplomacy” manifesto, one can hardly expect that China will capitulate to its smaller, weaker neighbors. Doing so would both undermine its growing reputation as a maritime power and undercut its goal to become an established world power.

As China looks to enhance its international prestige, it is hard to believe that its leaders would tolerate the land claims of competing Asian nations. Also, it takes two parties to come to an agreement, so it is not up to China alone to guarantee the peaceful resolution of land disputes. The other disputants involved would have to make the same pledge to avoid territorial conflicts. Moreover, China’s rising national power may induce its leaders to initiate unpredictable, aggressive strategies in the future. The United States cannot orchestrate a grand bargain based on promised concessions.